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I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 1986, an historic change in American immigration law occurred, when President Ronald Reagan signed into law
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,1 also known as
* Principal in the Chicago law firm of Susman & Associates, concentrating in the areas of customs, corporate immigration, and international trade law. Ms. Susman is a former
Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Jane A. Restani, U.S. Court of International Trade (NY),
and also interned for the U.S. Customs Service, Office of the Regional Counsel (Chicago),
where she received a merit award for excellence in service. She is an active member of the
American Bar Association, International Law Section and American Immigration Lawyers
Association and a member of the Chicago Bar Association, Immigration and Naturalization
Committee. She serves on the Illinois State Bar Association, International and Immigration
Law Section Council. The author is a member of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
and is appointed to its Committee on Foreign Affairs. She was recently appointed a Director
on the Board of the International Trade Club (Chicago), and serves on the Board of Directors
for the Panamerican Council.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. (codified as enacted in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
[hereinafter "IRCA" or "The Act"].
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the Simpson-Rodino Act.' IRCA amends and adds to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. s Probably one of the most revolutionary highlights of the Act is that it not only affects and creates
new obligations for aliens of all kinds,4 but that it also impacts every
U.S. employer and employee, whether a citizen, legal permanent resident or alien. Another major feature of IRCA is that it not only
creates civil penalties, but also criminalizes different forms of prohibited conduct. In effect, the Act has introduced a new labor law,
which promises to impose as much change upon American labor relations, hiring and human resource management as it will upon immigration patterns and practices in the United States.
This article will not attempt to provide an exhaustive monograph analyzing all previously decided cases or potential issues that
might arise under IRCA, where Fourth Amendment concerns are
involved. But rather, it will focus primarily upon IRCA and its impact upon and relationship to the Fourth Amendment. It will first
describe the new procedures and requirements now to be satisfied
under the employment verification system, 5 the new civil and criminal sanctions prescribed by the Act0 and generally the sweeping
changes wrought by the enactment of IRCA. It will then consider
the past agency practices of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) and prior case authority, which had delineated somewhat the outlines of pre-existing Fourth Amendment protections extended to employers and employees prior to the passage of IRCA.
This will be followed by an analysis of presently untested and undelineated Fourth Amendment protections and concerns, as they might
or should be under the Act."
2. Enactment of the new law came as a major surprise to most observers. The law had
failed to achieve enactment in six sessions of Congress, over a period of ten years. On September 26, 1986, Representative Peter Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, pronounced the bill "dead," following a 202-180 House vote defeating a rule for floor debate.
However, by October 9, debate, amendment and passage by the full House was facilitated by a
compromise on farm labor provisions, making the bill more attractive to growers in the western United States. By October 17, a House-Senate joint conference committee version had
achieved passage by both houses. For a detailed history of the steps leading to passage of the
IRCA. See Interpreter Releases, Vol. 63, No. 42, Oct. 20, 1986.
3. Act of June 27, 1952 ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "INA"].

4. The term "aliens" includes: temporary (nonimmigrant) aliens, permanent aliens (immigrants), unauthorized aliens or illegal aliens, and intending citizens. See infra notes 16-17,
and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 72-186 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 187-229 and accompanying text.
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Finally, this article will conclude that IRCA's new procedures,
exclusive far-reaching regulatory system, and severe criminal penalties and sanctions create new Fourth Amendment concerns and warrant stricter adherence to now heightened Fourth Amendment standards in all phases of government contact with employers and
employees. In addition, IRCA should give rise to a heightened
awareness of the need to restrict initial encounters between officers
and individuals in the workplace. There are also problems associated
with the Act's allowance of warrantless visits or the presence of INS
or labor investigators on employers' premises for particular purposes
designated by the Act. It is also necessary to focus on the need to
restrict government officers' warrantless conduct, and highlight the
need for a criminal probable cause basis for warrants, which should
require individual specificity and particularity. In addition, the judiciary should become more demanding with regard to INS officials'
authority to enter premises warrantlessly for reasons other than
those specified in IRCA, INS authority to question employees on
employers' premises without a warrant, and what conduct constitutes
an unauthorized or unreasonable seizure.
II.

THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF
NEW LAW

1986: THE

IRCA establishes, for the first time, a systematic mechanism
that provides for: specific employer verification and recordkeeping
requirements; INS warrantless record inspection authority; increased
appropriations for enforcement activity; new penalties for unauthorized alien employees and both civil as well as criminal sanctions
against employers who violate the new laws. This system is aimed at
the ferreting out and removing illegal aliens throughout the U.S. by
way of the workplace. In the enactment of IRCA, Congress selected
employers as the primary tool for control of illegal immigration. The
new obligations imposed upon employers, and the penalties for
neglecting these obligations, are truly significant.
A.

Prohibition of Unlawful Employment of Aliens

Generally, IRCA proscribes two principal areas of employer
hiring: the actual hiring of illegal aliens and violation of paperwork
requirements. 9 IRCA makes it "unlawful for a person or other entity
9. IRCA does create other new areas of employer regulation and liabilities, such as discrimination against permanent resident aliens who are intending citizens; however, these areas
are not relevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis and hence outside the scope of this article.
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to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United
States . . .an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien...
with respect to such employment, 10 or . ..an individual without
complying with the" requirements of the Act's new employment verification system."1
The Act expressly exempts from coverage all hiring, recruiting
and referring of individuals for a fee, which occurred prior to the
date of its enactment, November 6, 1986.12 Consequently, an employer may continue to employ an alien who was hired before November 6, 1986, even with knowledge that the alien is unauthorized.
However, an employee who was hired prior to November 7, 1986
shall lose his or her pre-enactment status if any one of the following
14
events occur: the employee quits,13 is terminated by the employer,
is excluded or deported from the United States or departs from the
United States under an order of voluntary departure.13
An "unauthorized alien," 16 for purposes of the new prohibition,
is a person who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, not
authorized by the INS to be employed in the United States, or has
not maintained his/her nonimmigrant status which provided original
authorization for employment in the United States."
10. IRCA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (IRCA § 101(a)
amended INA § 274, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324 and added to INA § 274, § 274A, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1324a (West Supp. 1987)).
11. IRCA, § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(a)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1987). The new employment verification system [hereinafter "EVS"] is set forth in IRCA, § 101(a), INA § 274A

(B).
12. IRCA § 101(a)(3) provides:
Section 274A(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act shall not apply to the
hiring, or recruiting or referring of an individual for employment which has occurred before the date of the enactment of this Act.
See also 52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.7(a)).
13. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.7(b)(1)).
14. Id. at § 274a.7(b)(2). Termination under this subsection expressly includes, but is
not limited to, situations in which the employee is subject to seasonal employment.
15. Id. at § 274a.7(b)(3).
16. See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221-16,227 (1987). See also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(a) (definition-"unauthorized alien"), 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a) (classes of aliens authorized to accept
employment), 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b) (aliens authorized for employment with a specific employer incident to status).
17. Insofar as failure to maintain status, which would cause an alien to become 'unauthorized," an alien might allow his/her visa to expire. See IRCA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1324a.(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1987) ("unexpired endorsement of the Attorney General authorizing the individual's employment in the United States") (emphasis provided) or might
change jobs where prior work authorization may no longer apply, see, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg.
16,226 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a), (b)). Thus, failure to maintain status
would include the situation where the alien changes employers at a time when the alien has an
employer-specific nonimmigrant visa, and fails to obtain a new visa or work authorization for
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Distinct penalties attach to each of the different categories of
non-compliance. By far, sanctions for the employer's actual hiring of
illegal aliens, particularly where the hiring evidences a pattern or
practice or "harboring," in contrast to penalties for failure to maintain proper records, are the most severe in nature,1 8 and they range
in severity based upon the degree, frequency and nature of the employer's conduct or noncompliance.1 9
B. Employment Verification System (EVS)
IRCA forbids the hiring, recruiting or referring for a fee for
employment of any individual, for failure to follow a specific procedure to verify that the person is authorized to accept or continue in
such employment in the U.S. An important feature to this system is
that the EVS requires these special verification procedures to be followed regardless of the actual immigration status of each individual
being hired, recruited or referred for a fee; whether or not the individual is a U.S. citizen or an alien. Significantly, an employer that
has complied in good faith with the EVS requirements, has an affirmative defense under the Act to alleged violations of the hiring or
paperwork requirements.2"
The verification system requires the participation of both employers and employees in a record production, examination, attestation and keeping process. Both employer and employee must complete the INS form I-921 within three business days of the hire22 for
the new employer. In either case, this alien would not be an "unauthorized alien" for purposes
of the Act, and the hiring of such an individual with no attention to perfecting his/her immi-

gration status would prevent compliance with the verification process and expose the employer
to the risk of any of a number of sanctions, depending upon the circumstances. See infra notes

22-39 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
19. See id.
20.

IRCA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987) provides:
DEFENSE.-A person or entity that establishes that it has complied in good

faith with the requirements of subsection (b) with respect to the hiring, recruiting,
or referral for employment of an alien in the United States has established an affirmative defense that the person or entity has not violated paragraph (1)(A) with
respect to such hiring, recruiting, or referral.
52 Fed. Reg. 16,224 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.4) similarly provides:

An employer or a recruiter or referrer for a fee for employment who shows
good faith compliance with the employment verification requirements of section
274a.2(b) of this part shall have established a rebuttable affirmative defense that
the person or entity has not violated section 274A(a)(I)(A) of the Act with respect
to such hiring, recruiting, or referral.
21.

The Form 1-9, "Employment Eligibility Verification Form," may be obtained in lim-

ited quantities at INS District Offices, or ordered from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington, D.C. 20402. See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
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individuals hired after November 6, 1986 and who continue to be
employed after May 31, 1987.23 Completion of Form 1-9 involves the
processes of verification and attestation.
Employers must examine24 specified documents to be presented
by the employee in order to establish both: (1) the individual's identity as well as (2) the individual's authorization to work in the U.S.
Some documents establish both an individual's identity and authorization to work in the U.S. 25 In other cases, employers will need to
examine several documents in order to verify a person's identity2" as
274a.2).
22. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222 (1987) (to be codified at § 274a.2(b)(l)(B)(ii)). The form 1-9
must be completed before the end of the first working day, in the case of employment of an
individual for a duration of less than three business days. Id. at § 274a.2 (b)(l)(iii).
23. Id. See supra note 12.
24. Employers are only required to examine certain specified documents under the EVS,
and are not requiredto retain photocopies. However, IRCA permits the photocopying of all
documentation presented by an individual in order to comply with EVS requirements. The Act
specifically overrules other statutes that would otherwise forbid the photocopying by employers
of certain documents, such as a naturalization certificate, for the exclusive purpose of verification. IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987). See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,221
(1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(3)).
The issue of whether or not an employer should make and retain photocopies of the documents presented and examined is open to some debate. On the one hand, retention of photocopies demonstrates that the subject documents were presented, and presumably examined.
This in itself would seem to evidence a good faith attempt at compliance. On the other hand, it
is possible that these same photocopies could give rise to further scrutiny and questioning into
whether or how the employer in could have believed that attestation based upon these documents was in good faith, where such documents were fraudulent or deficient. The inquiry
might then become any of a number of questions, such as, how "obvious" was the fraud or
deficiency, how much the employer knew (about immigration and nationality documents,
about compliance), or the relationship between the employer and employee.
25. Documents which establish both an employee's identity as well as authorization for
employment are:
(1) United States passport;
(2) Certificate of U.S. citizenship;
(3) Certificate of Naturalization;
(4) An unexpired foreign passport, provided it has an unexpired endorsement of employment authorization by the INS or U.S. Consulate;
(5) Alien Registration Green Card, INS form 1-551, (commonly referred to as the "green
card").
IRCA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1987). See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222
(1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)).
26. Documents which evidence only an individual's identity are:
(1) A driver's license or similar identification document issued by a state (the document
must contain a photograph of its holder or other identifying information approved by the
Attorney General), including: a state-issued driver's license or state-issued identification
card containing a photograph (if no photograph appears on the license, then it must contain identifying information, such as: name, date of birth, sex height, color of eyes, and
address); school identification card with a photograph; voter's registration card; U.S. military card or draft record; identification card issued by federal, state or local government
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well as employment authorization.2 7 In order to comply with the verification requirements, the employer must find that the document or

combination of documents presented "reasonably appears on its face
to be genuine." 28

Furthermore, the EVS requires that the employer, after examination of the above-described documents, attest, under penalty of
perjury29 that the employer has verified that the alien is not an unauthorized alien, by having examined that document or combination
of documents which demonstrates identity and authorization for employment.30 The employee must also attest, under penalty of perjury,
and on the same 1-9 form, that he/she is a citizen, a national, an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or an alien authorized to work in the U.S. al
Employers must retain the 1-9 forms and make them available
to the INS or the Department of Labor for a period of at least three
years after the date of hire or one year after the date an individual's
employment is terminated, whichever is later.32 Upon request by
INS or Department of Labor officers, the employer must make the I9 forms available for inspection at the location where the request for
agencies or entities; military dependent's identification card; native American tribal documents; United States Coastal Guard Merchant Marine Card; or Driver's License issued
by a Canadian government authority.
(2) Other documents to be approved by the Attorney General, in the case of individuals
under 16 years of age or states that do not provide suitable identification documents,
including: school record or report card; clinic doctor or hospital record; daycare or nursery
school record.
IRCA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1987). See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,222
(1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(B)).
27. Documents which evidence employment authorization are:
(1)a social security card (other than one stating that employment is not authorized);
(2) U.S. birth certificate or certificate of U.S. nationality at birth; or
(3) other documents evidencing authorization of employment in the United States, to be
approved by the Attorney General.
IRCA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1987).
28. IRCA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1987). The Act specifically rejects the creation of a national identification card. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(c) (West Supp.
1987).
29. Perjury is "the intentional false statement under oath or affirmation in judicial or
nonjudicial proceedings with knowledge of its falsity." M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW 420 (1978). Testimony or statements under oath must be given falsely and with knowledge that their nature is untrue. Perjury is a common law crime that requires a specific intent.
"To testify rashly and inconsiderately according to belief, or inadvertently, or by mistake, is
not perjury." J. MILLER, MILLER ON CRIMINAL LAW 470 (1934).
30. IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
31. Id. at § 1324a.(b)(2).
32. Id. at § 1324a.(b)(3).
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production was made, within seventy-two hours of the request.33 It is
also important to note that INS regulations expressly stipulate that
"[n]o subpoena or warrant shall be required for such inspection" by
the INS. 4
C. Unlawful Transportationof Aliens to the United States/
"Harboring"
In addition to the new prohibitions discussed above, IRCA has
opened up new areas of potential employer exposure to criminal liability for transportation, harboring or encouragement of illegal aliens
to enter the U.S. in violation of U.S. immigration laws.35 The new
Act has expanded both the conduct and the mental state that may
constitute unlawful transportation, harboring, encouragement to
enter in violation of U.S. immigration laws. This expansion increases
the likelihood that more employers will fall into the scope of these
now widened criminal provisions.
Historically, the harboring and transportation criminal provision
of the INA 6 has been aimed principally at the "coyotes," or professional "smugglers of humans." More recently, those involved in providing sanctuary to Central American refugees have also been
targeted under this section."' The proviso had long shielded employers from criminal liability for the "mere employment" of illegal
aliens.
In the past, INA section 1324 carried with it the mitigating
proviso, often referred to as the "Texas proviso," that "employment
(including the usual and normal practices incident to employment)
shall not be deemed to constitute harboring. '38 This proviso was interpreted to require more than mere employment on the part of the
employer, or "employment plus," 39 before the harsh criminal penalties of the harboring statute were triggered. IRCA eliminates this
33.

52 Fed. Reg. 16,223 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.8(b)(2)(ii)). If such

records are maintained else-where, for example, at corporate "headquarters," the same period
of time for production is allowed, but INS regulations apparently require that these be produced at the nearest Service office to the location. Id.

34. Id.
35.

See IRCA § 112(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (amending INA

§ 274(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)).
8 U.S.C. § 1324.
37. See Maggio, Other Criminal Penalties, Seizure, Enforcement, in THE NEW SIMPSON-RODINO IMMIGRATION LAW OF 1986 135 (S. Mailman ed. 1986).
36.

38.
39.

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4).
Rosenberg, Unlawful Transportationof Aliens to the United States and Bringing in
and Harboring Certain Aliens, in THE NEW SIMPSON-RODINO IMMIGRATION LAW OF 1986
139, 143 (S. Mailman ed. 1986).
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proviso, thus opening a whole new area of concern, risk and interpretation to employers.40 The great potential for criminal liability in the
new laws, distinctly lacking the "Texas proviso," will likely be the
subject of much future debate and litigation and certainly must be
considered in any Fourth Amendment analysis relating to the entry
of immigration officers onto employers' premises.4
It is now a potential criminal violation to bring or attempt to
bring an unlawful alien into the United States "in any manner whatsoever." 42 New Subsection 274(a) of the INA43 criminalizes an employer's action in knowingly bringing or attempting to bring an alien
to the United States "in any manner whatsoever

. . .

regardless of

any future action which may be taken with respect to such alien."44
Similarly, the new subsection proscribes the assisting of aliens who
have come to, entered, or remained in the United States in violation
of the law "knowingly or in reckless disregard" of the violation,45
and the encouragement or inducement of the alien to "come to, enter
or reside in the United States . . . in violation of the law."' 46 At least
one commentator has posited that on the face of the Act, it is at
least arguable that "mere employment" may constitute conduct
which "substantially facilitates an alien's remaining in the United
'47
States.
In addition, the prior level of intent standard under section
1324, "reasonable grounds to believe", has been supplanted by a
"reckless disregard of the fact" standard. It is now a violation where
the employer or defendant acts "knowing" or "in reckless disregard
of the fact" that the alien either entered illegally or is in the U.S.
illegally. Likewise, the Act proscribes encouraging or inducing "an
alien to come to, enter or reside in the United States" either "knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact" that such coming to, entry,
or residence is or will be in violation of law. 48 Furthermore, the requirement that the employer-violator must either know or have rea40. The greater risk of and expanded definitions of criminal liability are apparent. The
Service has already issued thousands of warning citations and notices of intent to fine. See
Interpreter Releases, Vol. 65, No. 6, Feb. 8, 1988, at 133.
41. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.

42. See IRCA § 112, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(A)-(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
43.

Id.

44. Id.
45. IRCA
46. Id. at
47.

§ 112, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
§ 1324(a)(1)(D).

See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 143. ("Certainly it can be argued that employment

satisfies an alien survival needs, and thus, substantially facilitates an alien's remaining in the
country.")
48.

IRCA § 112, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1987).
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sonable grounds to believe that the alien's last entry into the United
States occurred within the past three (3) years is eliminated under
the Act. 9
Certain terms contained in the harboring provisions have been
interpreted in the past. "Harboring" under section 1324 has been
broadly defined in the past and includes any activity tending substantially to facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States illegally.50 Prior judicial interpretations of the legislative history have
generally rejected the argument that "harboring" requires conduct
which is secret or clandestine in nature.51 "Knowledge" has constituted in the past, knowing of the illegal status of the alien and knowingly concealing, harboring, or shielding the alien from detection. It
has not required knowledge by the defendant that the conduct was
illegal.5 2 "Inducing" an alien to enter the United States has in the
past been defined so broadly that the offense is committed when the
inducement to enter is made, (even if no entry is ultimately made)."
D. Penalties Under the IRCA Provisions
The IRCA dramatically revamps current U.S. employment laws
by imposing civil, equitable and criminal sanctions upon persons or
entities which recruit, hire, or employ aliens who do not have work
authorization.
1. Civil Penalties
An employer, recruiter or referrer for a fee may face civil penalties for violation of section 101 of the Act, prohibiting the employment of unauthorized aliens and imposing certain recordkeeping and
verification requirements." In determining the level of the penalties
to be imposed, a finding of more than one violation in the course of a
single proceeding or determination will be counted as a single violation. However, a single violation will include penalties for each unau49.

See IRCA § 112 (1986).

50. United States v. Contu, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1977), reh. denied, 561 F.2d 831
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).

51. See United States v. Acosta De Evans, 531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 836 (1976); United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d. Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975) (Act of 1952 amended the "conceal or harbor" conduct specified
under the 1917 version of this subsection to include "shield from detection" as an additionally
prohibited act).
52.

United States v. Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120

(1983).
53. United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
54. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(e)(4)-(5) (Vest Supp. 1987). See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (1987)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(2)(i)-(v)).
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thorized alien determined to have been knowingly hired or recruited
or referred for a fee. 55
a. Civil Money Penalty for Paperwork Violations. The IRCA
provides for an order for civil monetary penalty for violation of the
"paperwork" or verification and recordkeeping provisions, as established by the EVS.56 It provides for the order of payment of a civil
penalty in an amount of not less than $100 and not more than
$1,000 for each individual with respect to whom such violation occurred. The Act further provides that in determining the amount of
the penalty, consideration be given to: the size of the business of the
employer being charged, the good faith of the employer, the seriousness of the violation, whether or not the individual was an unauthorized alien, and the history of previous violations.57
b. Sanctions for the Knowing Hire, Recruitment or Referral
of UnauthorizedAliens. An employer, recruiter or referrer for a fee
found to have knowingly hired or to have knowingly recruited or referred for a fee an unauthorized alien for employment in the United
States or to have knowingly continued to employ an unauthorized
alien, may be subject to a variety of orders. 58 An Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) may order the party to cease and desist from the
illegal behavior. 59 In addition, an ALJ may also order the offending
party to pay civil fines according to a schedule based upon number
of violations, ranging from $250 to $10,000 for each unauthorized
alien.6 0 A pattern and practice of unlawful employment, recruitment
or referral may also be enjoined. 6 '
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 52 Fed. Reg. 16,225 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1)).
59. Id.
60. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(C) provides in pertinent part:
[a] respondent found ... to have knowingly hired or to have knowingly recruited or
referred for a fee unauthorized alien for employment in the United States or to have
knowingly continued to employ an unauthorized alien, shall be subject to the
following:
...[t]o pay a civil fine according to the following schedule:
(A) First violation-not less than $250 and not more than $2,000 for
each unauthorized alien; or
(B) Second violation-not less than $2,000 and not more than $5,000
for each unauthorized alien; or
(C) More than two violations-not less than $3,000 and not more
than $10,000 for each unauthorized alien.
61. Id.
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Criminal Penalties

a. Unlawful Harboring, Transportation and Encouragement
to Enter in Violation of the Law. The "harboring" statute, prohibiting unlawful harboring, transportation and encouragement of aliens
to enter into the United States, amending subsection (a) of INA section 274 and eliminating the "Texas proviso,''62 carries stiff criminal
penalties for violation of its terms. Section 274(a) (2) penalizes any
person who violates its terms knowingly or in reckless disregard of
the fact that the alien is not authorized to work, for each transaction, regardless of the number of aliens involved. Criminal sanctions
imposed for violation of the harboring statute include: fine "inaccordance with title 18, United States Code, or imprisonment not more
than one year, or both."6
More severe criminal penalties are imposed for conduct falling
into the following categories: a second or subsequent offense, an offense committed for the purpose of commercial advantage or private
financial gain, or an offense in which the alien is not upon arrival
immediately brought and presented to an appropriate immigration
officer at a designated port of entry.6 4 Sanctions for these more serious types of conduct are: fine "in accordance with title 18 United
States Code, or imprisonment not more than five years, or both."6 5
b. Criminal Penalties for Pattern and Practice Violations.
Any person or entity engaging in a pattern or practice of violations
involving the hiring, recruiting or referring for a fee of unauthorized
aliens 6 or to continue employing an alien who is or has become unauthorized with respect to employment will be subject to criminal
sanctions,6 7 where such conduct constitutes a pattern or practice of
unauthorized alien employment.68
"Pattern or practice" means "regular, repeated and intentional
' The
activities," and not "isolated, sporadic or accidental acts."69
meaning derives from extensive judicial construction of other federal
statutes.70
62.

See notes 23-26 and accompanying text.

63.

IRCA § 112, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).

64.

Id.

65. Id.
66. See IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.(f)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1987).
67. Id.

68. Id.
69.
Rep."].

H.R. Rep. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I at 59 (1986) [hereinafter "H.R.

70. See. e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq., the Fair Housing
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c. Penaltiesfor Perjury. As discussed above, a basic feature of
the new EVS requires both employer as well as employee to attest to
the veracity of their statements made in the INS forms. Intentional
false statements may trigger appropriate criminal punishment.7
III. PRE-IRCA FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR
EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES AGAINST INS SEARCH AND SEIZURE
OF ALIENS
A.

INS Authority to Search and Seize Illegal Aliens

The authority granted to INS in order for its conduct of enforcement activities in the areas of search and seizure is primarily
comprised of the following three areas: (1) border patrol authority
for external boundaries; (2) INS authority to interrogate without
warrant; (3) INS authority to attest.7 2 During this analysis it is important to keep in mind the separate types of searches which INS
enforcement activities have generally given rise to in the past: (1)
patrol of the nation's borders, and (2) area control operations and
urban searches."
1. Borders or "FunctionalEquivalent"
INS Border Officers have special authorization, pursuant to section 287(a)(3) of the INA without warrant, within a reasonable distance 74 from any external boundary of the United States, to board
and search for aliens, any vessel, aircraft, railway car, or other conveyance or vehicle in which they believe aliens are being brought to
the United States, as well as to board and search any of the above
listed vehicles or conveyances for aliens.7 5 Under normal circumstances this provision does not apply to employers' premises.
Immigration Border Officers are also authorized in section
287(a)(3) of the INA "within a distance of twenty-five miles from
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq. See
also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337, n.16 (1977);
United States v. International Association of Ironworkers Local No. 1, 438 F.2d 679, 681 (7th
Cir. 1971).
71. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
72. See INA § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1952).
73. See Note Brief Encounters of the Alien Kind-Challenges to Factory Sweeps and
Detentive Questioning: I.N.S. v. Delgado, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 473, 491 (1985). See also
Fragomen, Jr., Searchingfor Illegal Aliens: The Immigration Service Encounters the Fourth
Amendment, 13 SAN DIEo L. REV. 82, 83 (1975).

74. INS regulations define "reasonable distance" to mean "within 100 miles from any
" 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2).
external boundary of the United States ..
75. INA § 287(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3).
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external boundary [of the United States] to have access to

private lands, but not dwellings for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the U.S.17 6 While this
section permits warrantless access to private lands (excluding dwellings) within twenty five (25) miles of an external boundary, such
access must be for the limited purpose of patrolling the border to
prevent illegal entry of aliens into the United States." It does not
expressly authorize random or roving warrantless searches of private
lands at points where illegal entry can not be prevented. Thus, section 287 provides greater authority to INS to search for illegal aliens
at the border or its functional equivalent, 8 but does not confer any
additional extraordinary authority to Border Patrol in relation to
searches of or entrance onto employers' premises, regardless of their
location.
The INS Border Patrol may conduct warrantless searches only
at the frontier or its functional equivalent.7 9 Functional equivalency
is determined by whether it is likely that traffic which did not cross
the border would arrive at that particular point. Examples of functional equivalents are: an established station near the border, a point
76. Id. Immigration Regulations define "external boundary" as: "the land boundaries
and the coast line of the United Stat9s, including the ports, harbors, bays and other enclosed
arms of the sea along the coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending three geographic
miles from the outer limits of the land that encloses an arm of the sea." 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.1(a)(1) (1987).
77. It is noted here that it appears that § 287(d) created by IRCA, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1357(d) (West Supp. 1987), would overrule any warrantless access to private lands constituting a farm or other agricultural operation or similar "open fields" within 25 miles from the
borders of the U.S., that might otherwise have been permissible pursuant to 287(a)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970), insofar as it expressly proscribes warrantless entry by the INS into
"open fields." See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
78. It is interesting to note that one commentator has observed: "...
searches at the
border have never been predicated upon the authority contained in section 287, but flow directly from the concept of sovereignty." Fragomen, Jr., supra note 73, at 91.
79. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Supreme Court for
the first time limited the scope of the term "border search," and thereby restricted the use of
roving immigration patrols to search vehicles for aliens, by holding such warrantless searches
were only permissible at the border or its functional equivalents. The Court held that, absent
probable cause or consent, the search of the plaintiff's car on a road that at all points lies at
least twenty miles or more north of the U.S.-Mexico border, was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 272-73. The Court
stated:
The search in the present case was conducted in the unfettered discretion of the
members of the Border Patrol, who did not have a warrant, probable cause, or consent. The search thus embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it
insisted that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining
a warrant prior to the inspection.
Id. at 270 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
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marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the
border, or an airport receiving nonstop flights from abroad. 0
The Second Circuit in United States v. Barbera,81 provided further example of what is not a functional equivalent. In Barbera,the
court found that where immigration officers had boarded a public
bus in the vicinity of the border and had for no ostensible reason
interrogated the defendant, a passenger on the bus, the arrest was
unlawful since it had not occurred at the border or a functional
equivalent thereof. It follows that an employer's premises, a plant, a
restaurant, or other commercial enterprise, even if very close to the
border, is not covered by the concept of "functional equivalent." 82
2.

INS Authority to Interrogate and Arrest Without Warrant
In contrast, the application of subsections 287(a)(1) and (2) of
the INA are not limited to INS Border Patrol alone, but rather extend to all INS officers, so authorized. Subsections 287(a)(1) and
(2) generally provide for the warrantless power to interrogate and
arrest aliens for certain reasons or where certain conditions exist.
Section 287 of the INA provides:
(a) [a]ny officer of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General . . .the power without warrant(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to
his right to be or remain in the United States;
(2) to arrest any alien. . . in the United States, if he has reason to
believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation
of any such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest... 83
The language of the statute is unqualified, and there is no facial requirement that the officer must have probable cause for such an inquiry. It was not until the early 1970's that this broad discretion was
first judicially curbed.84
In view of the fact that the INS Border Patrol and other officers
are not legally vested with any additional or extraordinary authority
to enter employers' premises in order to search for or interrogate
80.

Id. at 272-73.

81.

514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).

82. It is noted that these "border" cases should not be read in isolation. But rather many
principles established in these cases are better established than in other contexts and should be
considered and applied, where appropriate in other areas, such as urban or factory searches.
83. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
84. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Cheung Tin Wong v.
INS, 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Fragomen, Jr., supra note 73, at 95 ("prior to
several years ago, fourth amendment rights of aliens were exceedingly constrained").
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illegal aliens, the remainder of this discussion will focus on the general Fourth Amendment limitations upon INS officers' authority to
enter employers' premises in order to interrogate, search for and
seize unlawful aliens.
B. Fourth Amendment Limitation on INS Authority to Search
for or Otherwise Seize Aliens on Employers' Premises
It is imperative to note at the outset of this discussion that the
state of the law regarding the pre-IRCA scope of Fourth Amendment protections in the immigration context is far from clear or settled. It has been said that the Fourth Amendment's85 mandates of
reasonableness and specificity and the statutory requirement of belief
of alienage in section 287 of the INA are polar opposites. 86 In order
to satisfy the reasonable requirement of the Fourth Amendment, a
seizure must be based upon an individualized reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity; 87 while compliance with section 287 on its face
only requires that the agent need believe that the person to be questioned is an alien. 8 Rather than consider the constitutionality of section 287, the courts have instead attempted to reconcile it with the
Fourth Amendment, which has resulted in the application of a twotier analysis.
The first tier of the analysis is derived from INA section
287(a)(1). 89 That section allows an agent to question anyone believed to be an alien about his or her right to remain in the United
States, and effectively permits stops based upon mere suspicion of
alienage, i.e., ethnicity. 90 The second tier of the analysis corresponds
with INA section 287(a)(2), which permits an agent to detain anyone he reasonably believes to be in the country illegally and to arrest
such person if the agent believes he is likely to escape. 91
An absolute prerequisite to the INS' ability to interrogate individuals pursuant to section 287 as to their right to be or remain in
the United States is that the Service must be lawfully on an emU.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no War-

85.

rants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

86. See Note, supra note 73, at 502.
87.

See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

88. See INA § 287(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1970).
89.
90.
91.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 73, at 502.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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ployer's premises. For these purposes, the INS may only be lawfully
on the employer's premises pursuant to either: (1) valid search warrant, or (2) owner's voluntary consent. These two areas will be discussed further below.
1. Initial Encounter and Two-Tier Analysis: Limitations on INS
Authority to Interrogate
Despite the "without warrant" language of section 287, judicial
decisions in recent years have placed some limitations on the power
of immigration officers to conduct preliminary inquiries for the purpose of locating law violators. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,"
the Supreme Court ruled that such interrogations generally must be
supported by reasonable suspicion that the person interrogated is an
alien. Significantly, the Court expressly reserved the question of
whether the officers must also have a reasonable belief that the interrogated person is illegally in the U.S.9" The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits have held that a reasonable suspicion of alienage is all that is required for the INS to merely question
a person concerning his right to be in the United States, as distinguished from detention of the individual, which would not be so
94
authorized .
In Cheung Tin Wong v. INS,95 in discussing section 287(a)(1)
interrogations, the D.C. Circuit indicated that a mere foreign appearance by itself could not give rise to authority to detain an individual for questioning.9" The Court enunciated the principal that
when a reasonable suspicion that a person is an alien turns into a
reasonable belief that he is in the country illegally, an investigator is
authorized to engage in "forcible detention of a temporary nature for
the purpose of detailed interrogation. 97 If no reasonable suspicion of
92.

422 U.S. 873 (1975).

93. Id. at n.9.
94. Illinois Migrants Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) modifying 540
F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976); Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F. 2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982). But see Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100

(S.D. N.Y. 1977) ("area control" selective interrogation; declaratory judgment issued that
INS needed reasonable suspicion that persons interrogated were both aliens and illegally present in the U.S.).
95. 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
96. The D.C. Circuit stated:
We do not intend to in any way suggest that the appearance of being Oriental is in

any respect "suspicious," and we wish to state in unequivocal terms that we could
never condone stopping or questioning an individual simply because he looked to be

of Oriental descent. Id. at 1127 (emphasis supplied).
97.

Cheung Tin Wong, 468 F.2d at 1126-27; Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217 (D.C.
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illegal alienage exists, no further detention or forceful questioning
may be applied, because it would likely result in an unreasonable
seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment.98
Similarly, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,99 the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of
traditional arrest. In Brignoni-Ponce,the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment barred the stopping and questioning of individuals
about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion. The court
found the INS' actions inconsistent with Fourth Amendment protections where the only ground for suspicion that the occupants of a
vehicle near the border were aliens consisted of their Mexican
appearance. 0 0
The primary area in which the Service has not deferred to the
case law and analysis discussed above are in its procedures for interrogations conducted mainly at places of business and restaurants. 10 1
The Service has demonstrated in the past that it believes once the
officer has received permission from the employer to enter the premises, any person thereon may be interrogated. 10 2
In this regard, the reasoning of the case of United States v. BarCir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
98. An official internal U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service memorandum concerning "The Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure For Immigration
Officers" (Rev. January, 1983) [time-stamped December 27, 1983] [hereinafter "Justice
Memorandum"] states at pg. 12:
It is Service policy that temporary forcible detention, not amounting to arrest, is
permissible for the purpose of conducting further interrogation of a person who is
reasonably suspected of being an alien illegally in the United States (emphasis provided) (citing Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Cheung Tin Wong v. U.S., 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Au Yi Lau v.
INS, 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971)).
99. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
100. See discussion of Brignoni-Poncecase in Fragomen, Jr., supra note 73 at 106. See
also U.S. v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. Matter of Chen, 12 1 & N Dec. 603 (1968), interrogation of employees made in a
restaurant with the owner's consent were found proper under § 287(a)(1) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), and subsequent arrest consistent with § 287(a)(2), 8 U.SC. §
1357(a)(2) of the same Act, which authorizes the arrest of an alien whom the officer has
reason to believe is in the United States in violation of law and is likely to escape before
warrant can be obtained for his arrest. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarado, 321 F.2d 336 (2d
Cir. 1963); Pineiro-Lopez v. Kennedy, 293 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
866 (1961); Diogo v. Holland, 132 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Pa. 1955)). In the Chen administrative
decision it was found that "[s]ervice officers need no authority to enter a public place to ask
the owner for permission to question his employees or to obtain his consent to search the
place." Id. at 607 (citing Amaya v. United States, 247 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 916 (1958)).
102. See Fragomen, Jr., supra note 73, at 115.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol5/iss1/1

18

Susman: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"): Impact U
Immigration Reform and Control Act

bera103 should be kept in mind. In Barbera, Service border patrol
conducted a "roving patrol" of a bus stopped at a station near the
Canadian border. The Second Circuit held on appeal that the "immune" border search and interrogation principle was inapplicable.
Further, the court held that while the Service officer's presence in
the public vehicle was permissible, the initial interrogation (very first
question) could only be made if there was "founded suspicion" that
the appellee was an alien. The principle established in the Barbera
case can be applied in any case in which the INS has lawful entry.
As in Barbera, even though the officer had access to the public place
(a public bus), his power to begin to interrogate a specific individual
could be invoked only upon obtaining "founded suspicion" that the
person is an alien. Even before the enactment of IRCA, the rule set
forth in Barbera should apply to any person about to be interrogated
at his place of employment by a Service official or Border Patrol. At
least one commentator has suggested that the employer has no right
to consent to interrogation of his employees since it is the employees'
Fourth Amendment rights that are in question.' °4
A further consideration to the concept of "voluntary consent,"
which may authorize permissible entry onto an employer's premises,
is presented by the case of United States v. Mendenhall.'05 In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court recognized that a seizure can be effected not only by physical force, but also by a show of official authority that effectively compels an individual to submit to the
intrusion."0 6 Thus, it is possible that an employer may provide "consent" to INS entry onto premises, and that this same consent might
be invalid, based upon a variety of objective factors.' Nevertheless,
103. 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).
104. See Fragomen, Jr., supra note 73, at 115; but see Matter of Chen, 12 1 & N Dec.
603 (1968) (interrogation of restaurant employees on owner's premises with owner's consent
found proper); Matter of King and Yang, 16 1 & N Dec. 502 (1978) (reasonable basis for
interrogation of restaurant employees with owner's consent, combined with past history of employment of illegal aliens and anonymous tip). See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1946) (although both corporations and individuals enjoy Fourth Amendment
protections, the rights granted to corporations are not as extensive).
105. 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion of Justices Stewart and Rehnquist).
106. Id. at 553-54; see also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985). The

Court previously alluded to this principle, that a nonconsensual stop can ultimately lead to an
illegal seizure, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
107. The Mendenhall Court set forth the following meaningful factors indicative of a
seizure, irrespective of alleged consent:
(I) threatening presence of several officers;
(2) display of weapons by the officer;
(3) some physical touching of the individual; and

(4) use of language or a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the request
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in the general case, unless significant seizure factors or a show of
authority are present, otherwise voluntary contact between an individual and a law enforcement officer does not, as a matter of law,
constitute a seizure. 108 Consequently, under Mendenhall, absent the
proper foundation, the INS officer is "merely questioning," 109 and no
invasion of an individual's privacy exists that would trigger the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of a particularized and objective
justification. 110
In INS v. Delgado,"' the Supreme Court considered similar issues utilizing the two-tier framework, specifically in the context of a
"factory survey" or a "factory sweep." In Delgado, the INS conducted three "factory surveys" at garment factories in Los Angeles,
California in 1977; two pursuant to search warrants and one pursuant to the owner's consent. 12 Based upon these surveys, two United
States citizens and two U.S. permanent residents claimed that their
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure had been violated." 3
The Delgado Court avoided the issue of the level of suspicion
required to stop persons and question them as to their right to remain in the United States. But rather, the Court essentially concluded that no seizure or detention of any individual had taken
place, so that the individual detentive or forcible questioning tier of
the analysis, reasonable suspicion, did not need to be entertained." 4
might be compelled.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218-19 (1984).
See Note, supra note 73, at 491.
466 U.S. 210 (1984).

112. The majority noted, as did Justice Powell in his concurring opinion, that "the INS
had obtained either a warrant or consent from the factory owners before entering the plants to
conduct the surveys." Id. at 222, n.l (Powell, J.,
concurring). Since the district court's holding
that a seizure which violated the Fourth Amendment had occurred, it did not need to reach
the search warrant issue; which was therefore not before the high court. Had the search warrant issue been challenged, the warrants may have been stricken for failure of specificity or
particularity. They had not named or described specific persons. Certainly there is an even
stronger possibility that these warrants would have been found constitutionally infirm, had this

case been decided today, subsequent to the passage of the IRCA. See infra notes 187-225 and
accompanying text.
113. See Note, supra note 73, at 483, for a thorough description of the underlying facts,
including: (1)surprise entry; (2) agents are conspicuously stationed at exits; (3) agents are
visibly armed, although no walkie-talkies are drawn; (4) the general reactions elicited are cries
of "Ia migra!" (immigration!); (5) many workers hide or run.
114. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 219 ("the only way the issue of individual questioning could
be presented would be if one of the named respondents had in fact been seized or detained.")

Id.
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The Delgado decision has been read to implicitly augment the INS'
power to "merely question" under the first tier of the analysis, as
Delgado would seem to permit INS to question anyone as to their
immigration status, without requiring suspicion of alienage, provided
the encounter is "voluntary." ' 5
Regardless of the Delgado Court's refusal to find a seizure on
the facts before it, the Court did discuss the further facts necessary
to support a finding of seizure. The Court indicated that a seizure
would be found where mere questioning is followed by a refusal to
respond, and then followed by any further detentive conduct on the
part of the agent. As Delgado does not address the issue of reasonable suspicion, it does not answer the question of whether the refusal
to respond to the questions of INS agents will, in and of itself, supply the appropriate level of reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage to
justify further detentive questioning. 1 6 However, it might be fairly
adduced from the Court's reasoning that refusal to respond, without
more, should not give rise to the reasonable suspicion sufficient to
justify any further detentive action.
2. Warrant Requirements
As relates to both commercial premises and homes, the Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable.'1 7 The businessman, like the occupant of a residence:
has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The
business man, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision
to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made
and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority
to enter by a warrant. L8
INS's right to "enter commercial premises, with a proper warrant,
115.

Id. at 217-18. See Note, supra note 73, at 503. ("Proliferation of such an analysis

can only result in continued and increased deprivation of fourth amendment protection from

unreasonable seizures of persons having characteristics in common with, and who work next to,
aliens in certain business establishments").
116. One commentator posits that this issue may present a veritable "catch-22" situation. If the individual merely refuses to respond, he/she might supply the appropriate level of

reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage to justify further intrusive conduct; on the other hand,
if the person does respond, he/she may simply fall within a "classic consensual encounter"
under Delgado standards and, as a result, will have to tolerate the intrusion. See Note, supra
note 73 at 509.
117. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).

118. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29 (citing See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. at 543).
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for the purpose of searching out a suspected violation of the immigration laws derives from its general statutory power to seek out and
question suspected illegal aliens."' 19
The validity of an administrative subpoena is dependent on
standards developed under the Fourth Amendment governing unreasonable searches and seizures. In general, it has been said that an
administrative subpoena must not be so broad as to be in the nature
of a fishing expedition. 120 The Supreme Court has liberally interpreted most agencies' subpoena power, giving validity to the sub2
poena whenever it is not unreasonable.' '
In any administrative subpoena situation, there are generally
three broad types of responses: (1) refusal to comply and a motion to
quash the subpoena as being served without appropriate power or
that it is overly broad, or that the items it seeks are not relevant; (2)
informal negotiation with representatives of the agency issuing the
subpoena to narrow its scope and limit the number of documents
produced or extend the time for production; or (3) immediate and
total compliance without any informal contact with the issuing
agency.
a. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo. In Blackie's
House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo,122 the D.C. Circuit Court considered
the validity of two separate warrants used to search the plaintiffemployer's restaurant. Each warrant was considered in separate
lower court decisions and was referred to by the D.C. Circuit as
Blackie's p23 and Blackie's IL.124 The D.C. Circuit's decision in
Blackie's is important because: (1) the decision confirmed the warrant requirement as a precondition to any right that the INS may
search or seize illegal aliens on employer's premises, absent employer's consent, in accordance with Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States;'25 and (2) the court explicitly decided that, since the INS
searches were the product of "hybrid administrative law enforcement
activities in a non-criminal context,' 126 a relaxed standard of probable cause less than that required in criminal cases was sufficient for
119. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1222 (1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 940 (1982) (emphasis supplied).

120. See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
659 F.2d 1211 (1981).
Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 467 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 1978).
Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 480 F. Supp. 1078 (D.D.C. 1979).
413 U.S. 266 (1973).
Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1222 (emphasis supplied).
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warrants relating to INS enforcement activity.

In Blackie's, the Service had collected various types of evidence 127 indicating that illegal aliens were being employed at the
Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. restaurants. 2 8 After the responsible

INS agent had twice been denied the owner's permission to enter the
restaurant premises, he presented the assembled evidence accompa-

nied by affidavits to a federal magistrate, requesting the issuance of
a search warrant to assist the INS in its search for and arrest of "the

individuals subject to arrest pursuant to Title 8, United States Code,
Section 1357. ''x29 In Blackie's I, the magistrate issued a standard
form warrant' 30 allowing the INS, within five days of the warrant's
issuance, to search the "entire premises of Blackie's House of
Beef."'' INS premised the warrant in Blackie's I on Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP).132 INS agents exe127. In 1976, the INS began to receive information that illegal aliens were employed at Blackie's. One such indication was a sworn statement by an illegal alien
who had been apprehended by the INS and was in the process of undergoing deportation hearings. This informant swore that he had worked at Blackie's and, furthermore, that he had personal knowledge that approximately 20 other illegal aliens
were currently employed there . . . Another such affidavit was executed by an apprehended alien claiming to have worked at Blackie's. In addition to verifying the
information provided in the first affidavit, the second informant indicated that
"there were many Hispanics employed there and that the names of two illegal aliens
who worked there were Rogelio and Pedro" . . . Other information included three
anonymous telephone calls in which informants notified the INS that Blackie's was
employing illegal aliens . . . Finally, INS officers apprehended two illegal aliens
who were carrying wage statements from Blackie's . . . The latter of the two swore
by affidavit that Blackie's was employing illegal aliens from El Salvador and Africa,
and supplied the first names of three such employees.
Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1213-14.
The INS in Blackie's further submitted firsthand evidence obtained from a "stake out" of
Blackie's during working hours. The INS agent involved swore to his belief that many of the
employees were illegal aliens because of their attire and apparent inability to speak any language but Spanish. A different INS agent surveyed Blackie's during working hours and observed numerous persons of hispanic descent. In addition, the supporting evidence also included a news article containing essentially an admission of hiring illegal aliens by the
manager of Blackie's. Included among all of this information were names of suspected illegal
aliens working at Blackie's, descriptions of their person and clothing, and identification of
where suspects might be hiding. Id. at 1215.
128. Ulysses "Blackie" Auger was owner and operator of Blackie's House of Beef, Inc.,
which operated the Blackie's House of Beef Restaurant and Deja Vu Cocktail Lounge located
in Washington, D.C.
129. This statute sets forth the authority granted to immigration officers and employees.
130. On the warrant the word "property" was marked out and the word "persons" inserted in the text of the warrant, which provided that "there is probable cause to believe that
the persons so described are being concealed on the person or premises above described." Id.
at 1214.
131. Id.
132. Rule 41, FED. R. CRIM. P., authorizes the issuance of warrants in aid of criminal
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cuted the warrant, entering Blackie's Restaurant during the dinner
hour. 133 Fifteen employees were seized, at least 10 of whom proved
to be subject to deportation as illegal aliens.134
The second warrant in Blackie's 1I was sought and issued after
the District Court in Blackie's I had struck down the first warrant.
Unlike the first, the second was not a "form warrant," and was not
based on Rule 41 of the FRCP. Rather, the second warrant premised INS' authority to search on sections 1357131 and 1103136 of
the INA. The second warrant was entitled "Order for Entry on
Premises to Search for Aliens in the United States Without Legal
Authority." The second warrant contained certain limitations, 137 but
broadly permitted the search to include "any locked rooms on the
premises in order to locate aliens in the United States without legal
authority. ' 138 Fourteen 13illegal
aliens were found on the premises
9
during this second raid.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Blackie's consolidated the appeals of the lower court rulings in Blackie's I and Blackie's I1.140
The Circuit Court addressed the issues presented by Blackie's I:
whether the INS may rely on Rule 41 of the FRCP to obtain a
search warrant; and by Blackie's II. (1) the authority of the INS to
seek, and of the District Court to grant authority by warrant for
access to commercial premises to question persons believed to be illegal aliens; and (2) the level of probable cause required for such a
warrant. In deciding the second issues in Blackie's II, the court also
resolved the question in Blackie's L
The D.C. Circuit in Blackie's based its decision on three principles: (1) "Congress, in passing the Immigration and Nationality Act,
contemplated a vigorous enforcement program that might include
investigations.
133. The warrant had been issued on March 27, 1978, and was executed on March 30,
1978. 659 F.2d at 1214.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1215. See supra note 129.
136. INA § 1103 covers the powers and duties of the Attorney General and the INS
Commissioner relating to the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws.
137. It directed the INS to enter the premises at a certain entrance, limited the INS'

search to daylight hours and within ten days of the order, and required a return within ten
days after completion of the search. Id. at 1215-16.
138. Id. at 1216.
139. Id.
140. On two separate occasions, Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. challenged each of the
two warrants, seeking injunctive relief and damages, and on each occasion, the District Court

held each warrant invalid, as violative of the Fourth Amendment requirement that "no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, . . . particularly describing . . . the persons or
things to be seized." Id. at 1211-12.
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INS entries onto private premises for the purpose of questioning 'any
alien or person believed to be an alien,' and of detaining those aliens
believed to be in this country illegally"; 1" 1 (2) "since an INS search
is conducted pursuant to a civil administrativemandate, the warrant
issued to permit such a search may therefore be evaluated under a
standard of probable cause different from that applied to criminal
warrants"; 142 and (3) "the warrant in Blackie's If was properly tailored both to protect the fourth amendment rights of Blackie's and
to aid the enforcement interests of the United States.' 4 3 The Circuit
Court sustained the lower court's decision invalidating the first warrant, which was predicated on FRCP 41, because of the civil-nature
of the immigration search activity and the fact that criminal Rule 41
44
was not suited to a civil investigation.1
In its conclusions, the Court relied heavily on the reasoning of
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 45 in which the Supreme Court discussed
the type of warrant sufficient to support a routine inspection conducted by OSHA in fulfillment of its regulatory responsibilities. The
Court reasoned: Probable cause in the criminal sense is not
required.'46
In Blackie's, the D.C. Circuit pointed out that courts have balanced the government's interest in enforcing the immigration laws
against the privacy interests of those whom the INS seeks to investigate. 41 In Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod,148 the Northern District Court of Illinois stated:
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. Therefore,
once it is determined that a "seizure" has occurred, the question
arises whether it is reasonable. This requires balancing the public
141.

Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1218.

142.

Id. at 1218-19 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (emphasis

supplied)).

143.

Id. at 1219.

144.
145.
146.

Id.at 1217.
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
The court indicated that:

[flor purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an
existing violation but also on a showing that "reasonable legislative or administra-

tive standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]."
Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1223 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 538 (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (emphasis added by D.C. Circuit)).
The Court was rejecting the argument that OSHA could only obtain a warrant on a showing
that illegal working conditions existed on those very premises.
147. Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1221.
148. 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's interest in remaining free of arbitrary or oppressive governmental intrusions.' 49 The general requirement for a reasonable seizure is probable cause.'""

However, the Blackie's court reasoned that the immigration context
calls for "a more flexible definition of probable cause to comport
with the multiplicity of 'hybrid' administrative law enforcement activities in a non-criminal context."'5 1 The Circuit Court in Blackie's
found that the lower court's "fundamental error lay in requiring that
the INS meet the same level of probable cause as is appropriate in
the case of criminal warrants." 52
The decision in Blackie's did not differentiate between the
search of a restaurant or other establishment with both public and
private areas. This left unclear whether an INS officer has the right
to enter into the public areas of a restaurant, whether as a patron or
in his professional capacity, and intrude on its patrons by interrogating, without a warrant, a person he or she believes to be an alien. In
this regard, based upon the Barbera case, 53 the officer must arguably have, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion in the first instance.
Appearance or difficulties with the English language are generally
not great enough indicators to constitute the requisite reasonable
suspicion for detentive questioning.'5 However, as will be argued below, because of the possibility that INS officers may interrogate employees in public areas of the employer's premises, the best view
would be to require warrants based on criminal probable cause standards for searches in both private as well as public areas of an employer's premises.
In Blackie's, the warrant issued to INS restricted official conduct inside the premises. The search could only be conducted where
aliens were likely to be hiding, and it was uncontroverted that aliens
were in fact hidden. It further limited INS to questioning only those
employees whom INS agents reasonably believed to be aliens. Furthermore, the warrant proscribed the INS from searching Blackie's
files or books. 155 The court apparently was influenced by the reasona149. Id. at 1016 (citing with approval United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
555 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I,
20-21 (1968)).
150. Id.
151. Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1222.
152. Id. at 1228.
153. United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).
154. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
155. Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1226.
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bleness of the warrant issued, particularly in combination with the
evidence that had been collected of the presence of aliens working in
Blackie's restaurant.
Under the former laws and existing case law, a factor contributing to the probable cause standard adopted for INS and other
agency related warrants is the fact that the Supreme Court has in
the past held that detention and deportation of illegal aliens is not
criminal law enforcement activity. 156 INS warrants are "issued to
aid the agency in the enforcement of its statutory mandate, not to
aid police in the enforcement of criminal laws. 11 7 However, at the
time of the decision in Blackie's, and as highlighted by that court,
there were no existing sanctions of any kind, criminal or otherwise,
imposed by law upon a knowing employer of illegal aliens.158
b. International Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union
No. 164 v. Nelson. The case of International Molders' and Allied
Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson 59 is the latest case involving the question of the validity and effect of a warrant issued by a
United States magistrate permitting the INS to raid an employer's
workplace arising under pre-IRCA facts and circumstances. The InternationalMolders' case originally arose out of a series of approximately fifty workplace raids conducted by the INS and Border Patrol in Northern California during the week of April 26, 1982. The
plaintiffs 60 challenged the raid as violative of the Fourth and Fifth
156. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Blackie's, 659 F.
2d at 1218-19.
157. Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1218.

158.

Id. at 1218 (emphasis added).

159.

674 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1987).

160. The named plaintiffs were several businesses subjected to INS raids, individual
workers allegedly detained or seized in these same raids, and a labor union representing some

of these workers. In the earlier decision in International Molders' & Allied Workers Local
Union v. Nelson, 102 F.R.D. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1983), the Court had certified the additional
plaintiff class to consist of:
all persons of Hispanic or other Latin American ancestry, residing or working
within the jurisdiction of the San Francisco District Office of the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and/or the Livermore Border Patrol
Sector, who have in the past, are now, or may in the future be subjected to the

policies, practices, and conduct of INS and/or the Border Patrol during the course
of INS area control operations directed at places of employment other than open
fields.

Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
In addition to the employer-plaintiff, the Court found that all individual employee plain-

tiffs present at Petaluma Poultry Company (PPC) during the raid were proper plaintiffs and
entitled to contest the validity of the warrant in question. The Government argued that PPC as
employer was exclusively entitled and had standing to pose such a challenge.
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Amendments to the Constitution. In this context, plaintiffs asserted
that INS employed "warrants of inspection" as open licenses generally to interrogate and seize employees. 16' The plaintiffs' sixth
amended complaint before the Court at the time of hearing was limited to only one occasion of a raid conducted pursuant to a general
warrant. 1 62 Therefore, the Court's decision as well as this discussion
163
are limited to the one raid at issue.
In International Molders', the Government argued that the
warrant was valid, properly supported by a specific and reliable affidavit, and that actions taken pursuant to the warrant were justified.
Plaintiffs countered by arguing that the warrant was inadequately
supported, itself invalid, and that the subsequent seizure of illegal
aliens by use of the invalid warrant was illegal.' 4 The Court in InternationalMolders' agreed with the plaintiffs, granting their motion for partial summary judgment.'6 The Court found the warrant
constitutionally infirm, and its execution violative of the Fourth
The Court referred to its original decision in which it had previously rejected this argument. The Court had earlier found that the business and individual class plaintiffs were not
vicariously asserting each others' rights, but rather asserting their own rights. Cf. Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969); United States v. Nadler, 698 F. 2d 995, 998 (9th
Cir. 1983) (employers and employees may not vicariously assert each others' fourth amendment rights); cf. also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (lack of
certainty concerning to what degree workers can have any subjective expectation of privacy in
the workplace).
The Court found that individual worker plaintiffs . . . meet the traditional Article III standing requirements. They clearly have a "personal stake" in the litigation, owing to their alleged inquiries caused by the purported illegal conduct...
Even if the Court treats the workplace as a public area in which workers have no
reasonable expectation of privacy, workers are still entitled to assert their fourth
amendment rights against unreasonable searches, detentions, and seizures of their
persons, and their fifth amendment rights to equal protection.
International Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 643 F. Supp. 884,
889 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
161. Plaintiffs alleged:
that in a typical raid, the INS would block the exits from the work area and systematically question primarily hispanic workers about their immigration status. Although the warrant might refer to no more than four specific individuals, the INS
would use the "general warrant" to interrogate and to seize employees or any other
suspects en masse resulting in the arrest or detention of as many as seventy persons
in a single workplace raid.
InternationalMolders, 674 F. Supp. at 295.
162. In earlier pleadings, the plaintiffs had referred to eight separate incidents of raids,
Id.
163. This incident was the raid on PPC. Therefore, for purposes of ruling on the question of validity of INS general warrants, the Court looked to only this one controversy. Id.
164. Id.
165. The court also denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. Id. at
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Amendment. The Court invalidated the warrant as to all but the five
(5) named individuals (employees of the Petaluma Poultry Company

(PPC)), to whom it found the warrant sufficiently particularized.
The warrant used to gain entry to PPC was issued on April 23,

1982. The U.S. Magistrate issuing this warrant stated that there was
"reasonable cause to believe" that five named individuals "and
others" were illegally in the United States and could be found at this
employer's premises during normal working hours.1 6 The warrant
granted the INS broad authority to search for and to seize illegal
aliens.167
The sole basis for the issuance of the warrant in question was a
single affidavit sworn to by an INS officer.1 68 It was clear that the
officer's affidavit in support of the warrant was not even based on
personal knowledge. Rather, it consisted of seven ill-supported or
outdated pieces of information derived from cullings from INS
files.1 69 Employment records at PPC did indicate that five employees
of PPC were illegal aliens, but no grounds were set forth for a belief
that other illegal aliens were also employed there.
The Court first noted that the standard to test the validity of a
warrant is whether the warrant and supporting affidavit contain sufficient specificity and reliability to prevent the exercise of unbridled
discretion by law enforcement officers.170 "The purpose of this re166. Id. at 295.
167. The warrant authorized the INS: to search within a period of ten (10) days the
place named above for the persons specified, and others suspected of being illegal aliens, serving this warrant and making the search in the daytime (8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.), and if such
persons are found there to seize them, leaving a copy of this warrant and receipt for the persons taken, and prepare a written inventory of the person seized and promptly return this
warrant and the written inventory before Magistrate Richard S. Goldsmith, as required by
law. Id. at 295-96.
168. Judge Aguilar in InternationalMolders' found this fact along with the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of the INS officer supplying the affidavit, and the lack of
substantiation of underlying information to be of great weight in finding the warrant defective.
These factors also led the court to distinguish the warrant at issue there from the warrant
considered in Blackie's. Id. at 301-02 (describing impressive array of affidavits and evidence
assembled to support INS warrant application in Blackie's case). See Blackie's, 659 F.2d at
1213-15.
169. Two items were three and one-half year old references to a single incident in the
past wherein illegal aliens were discovered at PPC. One of the tips received indicating the
presence of illegal aliens at PPC was anonymous and general. The only other tip was received
from the Petaluma Police Department, but this in turn was admittedly based upon "numerous
anonymous calls" none of which the police corroborated. InternationalMolders', 674 F. Supp.
at 301.
170. International Molders, 674 F. Supp. at 296 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653-55 (1979); see also U.S. v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The
description [in the warrant] must be specific enough to enable the person conducting the
search reasonably to identify the things authorized to be seized.")
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quirement is 'to prevent the agents from having uncontrolled discretion to rummage everywhere in search of seizable [persons] once
lawfully within the premises.' ,,7 The court also cited the principle
that evidence presented in a warrant application must be particularized enough to allow a "neutral and detached" magistrate or court to
make an independent determination that probable cause exists for
the seizure of a particular person. 172 In addition, the Court indicated
that the questions of whether a warrant is adequate and based on
probable cause are to be decided on the face of the warrant and its
supporting affidavit, and the facts upon which the probable cause
determination is based "must appear within the four corners of the
73

warrant affidavit.'1
Judge Aguilar made two distinct findings regarding warrant validity as to the five named individuals on the one hand, and all
"others suspected of being illegal aliens" on the other hand. The
Court found that the affidavit, 74 including the INS' records regarding the five named illegal aliens, 7 5 provided sufficiently specific and
reliable information from which a neutral magistrate could find
probable cause for the seizure of the five named employees suspected
of illegal presence in the U.S. Therefore, the Court specifically found
the warrant to be constitutionally valid insofar as it permitted the
search for and arrest of the five named individuals.
171.

International Molders, 674 F. Supp. at 296 (citing International Molders' & Al-

lied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d at 552-53 (quoting U.S. v. Condo, 782
F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986)). See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)
("requirement that warrants shall particularly describe things to be seized makes general
searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant.")
172. InternationalMolders', 674 F. Supp. at 296 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
239 (1983) ("[an] affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause . . .[the magistrate's] action cannot be a mere ratification
of the bare conclusions of others")); see also U.S. v. Rubio, 727 F. 2d 786, 795 (9th Cir.
1984) ("The magistrate must be provided with sufficient facts from which he may draw the
inferences and form the conclusions necessary to a determination of probable cause,")
173. InternationalMolders, 674 F. Supp. at 296-97 (citing U.S. v. Anderson, 453 F.2d
174, 175 (9th Cir. 1971)); U.S. v. Grandstaff, 813 F.2d 1353-55 (9th Cir. 1987).
174. The affidavit stated that an October, 1978 raid on PPC uncovered seventeen (17)
illegal aliens employed by the company. Fifteen of the seventeen failed to appear for INS
interviews, allegedly because of warnings of potential deportation provided by PPC. The affidavit further stated that on November 5, 1981, an anonymous informant reported that PPC was
employing approximately thirty illegal aliens, many of whom had been arrested and deported
previously. Id. at 297.
175. There was also independent verification of prior deportation coincident with the
prior raid on PPC, of one of the five named aliens, through INS records. INS had also subpoenaed PPC's personnel files, which revealed that the five individuals named in the warrant had
records of illegal status and prior apprehensions. Id.
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While the Court applied the same legal standards to the seizure
of others suspected of being illegal aliens as it did to the seizure of
the five named individuals, it focused especially on the "general" or

"open-ended" nature of the warrant as applied to "all others".'7 6
The Court specifically adopted the terminology of "general" 17or7
"open-ended" warrants to be applied to warrants of this variety.
Relying on the Ninth Circuit's ruling in InternationalMolders"7 8
and its own original decision,'17 9 the Court concluded once again that
the warrant unconstitutionally authorized seizure of persons without

probable cause 80 and was patently invalid. The Court permanently
enjoined the defendants from seeking or employing such warrants in
the future.'18
176. The INS argued that the warrant used to enter PPC's premises was a "warrant of
inspection," and designed to permit inspection, not seizure. However, the Court found it to be
properly described as a "general warrant." The Court explained:
[the general aspect of the warrant is that it does not name all of those to whom it
was intended to apply; instead, the warrant mentions five specific individuals and
refers to 'others.' Furthermore, the warrant authorized far more than inspection. If
the INS found the specified individuals or 'others suspected of being illegal aliens,
the INS was authorized to seize them.'
Id.
177. The Court concluded that both in intent and practice the INS' warrants were
aimed at seizure of illegal aliens, and to describe them as "warrants of inspection" would be a
misrepresentation. Id. at 298.
The Court stated: "[n]o matter how the INS wishes to recast, recharacterize, or otherwise
misrepresent the warrant, it remains true that the warrant was fundamentally a license for the
INS to seize people simply because they were 'suspected of being illegal aliens,' whatever that
means." Id.
178. International Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547
(9th Cir. 1986).
179. International Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 643 F.
Supp. 884, 887-88 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
180. The court stated:
As this and other circuits have ruled on numerous occasions, a "lack of probable
cause cannot be made up in hindsight by a hypothetical variation in the basis on
which a search was conducted." U.S. v. Branch; 545 F.2d 177, 186 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1976), quoting U.S. v. Cunningham, 424 F. 2d 942, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 914 (1970); see also Llaguno v. Mingey, 739 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th
Cir. 984) ("The officers needed probable cause before they entered the house." (emphasis in original)), vacated on different grounds after rehearingen banc, 763 F.2d
U.S. _, 107 S. Ct. 16, 92 L.Ed. 2d 783.
1560 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, International Molders, 674 F. Supp. at 298-99.
181. "Notwithstanding the conclusion that the instant warrant was for seizure, the
Court went on to consider the warrant as a warrant of inspection, since there remained the
possibility that the warrant could be upheld in part as a warrant of inspection." Id. at 299. In
order to make this determination, the court pointed out that the correct standard to be applied
is that articulated in Blackie's. The Court emphasized that
despite the fact that the lower court finding that the warrants authorized seizures
was "amply supported by the record," the circuit panel found it "unnecessary . ..
to decide whether the hybrid probable cause standard that Blackie's applied to entry
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Despite the Court's finding that Blackie's was inapposite to the
case before it, the Court went on to distinguish InternationalMolders' from the Blackie's case on three principal grounds:18 2 (1) the
Court indicated that the warrant is distinguishable from the warrant
in Blackie's based on the facts of each case; 183 (2) the Court further
indicated that the warrant was deficient under the legal standard
identified in Blackie's 84; and (3) the warrant in InternationalMolders' needlessly threatened the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals present in the targeted workforce.1 8 5
The Court concluded once again that the warrant used to raid
PPC was a seizure warrant. The warrant did not authorize the INS
merely to "inspect," but rather to seize. 86 Moreover, the Court
found that even under the pertinent relaxed "hybrid" criterion of
Blackie's, the unlimited warrant was still deficient. Absent checks to
place limits on unbridled INS discretion, the Court found that the
warrants should apply to warrants that, on their face, authorize seizure of suspected
illegal aliens."
Id. at 299 (citing InternationalMolders, 799 F.2d at 552, n.5. The Court once again concluded that the warrant was a warrant for seizure). Id.
182. Id. at 299. The court noted that Blackie's has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit
and that it was controlling law in the case. See InternationalMolders', 799 F.2d at 553.
183. Although the Court clearly believed that the factual difference that the warrant in
Blackie's made no reference to seizure, in contrast to the warrant in InternationalMolders',
was determinative of the absolute factual distinction between the two cases, it ignored this
distinction and continued its analysis in deference to the Circuit Court. The Court stressed
that, beside the first difference, the distinction between the warrants centered on the affidavits
supporting them. In Blackie's, the INS assembled an extensive array of information, see 659
F.2d at 1222. In contrast, only one affidavit based on other than personal knowledge was used
in InternationalMolders. See 674 F. Supp. at 301. The Court found that "[b]oth in terms of
quality and quantity, the supporting material for the warrants in the two cases is radically
different," and on this factual basis alone the cases are distinguished. InternationalMolders',
674 F. Supp. at 301.
184. The Court found the radically different factual distinctions to have significant legal
implications. According to the Court, the most obvious of these being that the warrant simply
failed to meet even the relaxed standard in Blackie's. See InternationalMolders, 674 F,
Supp. at 301-02.
185. The Court found on the balance of interests that is supposed to characterize the
trade off between the Government's need to enforce the law and the individual's right to freedom and privacy, that the magistrate assigned disproportionate weight to the Government's
position. While the Blackie's standard is not the traditional "probable cause" of the ordinary
search warrant, the Court found that the application for a warrant must have sufficient specificity to enable the judge to make an independent determination of whether the standard for
issuance has been satisfied. The Court concluded that under the Blackie's standard, "the warrant and supporting affidavit did not contain 'sufficient specificity and reliability to prevent the
exercise of unbridled discretion by law enforcement officials. Id. at 302 (citing International
Molders', 659 F.2d at 1225).
186. Upon the finding of "others suspected of being illegal aliens," the warrant authorized seizure-without any inquiry into whether the suspicion was correct. Id. at 303.
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warrant and affidavit simply did not provide enough information.
IV. POST-IRCA FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR
EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE

The Immigration and Reform Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), does not
expressly alter the power or limitations thereon of immigration officers to search private employers' premises for illegal aliens. However, IRCA now subjects employers of illegal aliens to criminal prosecution and injunctive action. Criminal penalties may range from
imprisonment up to six months and/or fines of up to $3,000 for each
unauthorized alien for regular violations; up to $10,000 for each unauthorized alien for pattern and practice violations. Employers also
now risk civil as well as criminal violations and penalties for failure
to maintain required records, irrespective of whether illegal aliens
are actually employed.""7
The INS has traditionally conducted enforcement activities in
two contexts: patrol of the nation's borders or their "functional
equivalent," e.g., an airport; and area control operations.'88 IRCA
has added to this enforcement through establishment of the EVS,
which will elicit corresponding employer visits, allowing inspection
and determination of compliance with paperwork obligations and
will also further detection of unlawful alien employment.
Under current law, it should be kept in mind that, while Congress has expressed an interest in vigorous enforcement (public interest), all affected private parties have greater obligations, and are
open to greater intrusions. Individual employers certainly have more
at stake, involving the new verification and recordkeeping compliance requirements, as do citizen and legal permanent resident employees, insofar as the increased scrutiny and awareness of alienage,
may give rise to increased intrusions.8 9
Moreover, IRCA has opened up new areas of potential employer exposure to criminal liability for transportation, harboring or
encouragement of illegal aliens to enter the U.S. in violation of U.S.
immigration laws. 90 In the past, the criminal law relevant to the
187.
188.

See supra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 73.

189. It should generally be kept in mind that in enacting IRCA, Congress was sensitive
to the possibility of discrimination based on national origin or citizenship status. See IRCA
§ 274B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b.(a) (discrimination based on national origin or citizenship status is
an "immigration-related employment practice" under IRCA). In so providing, Congress has

implicitly acknowledged the possibility of increased intrusion.
190.

IRCA § 112, 8 U.S.C. § 1324; see supra notes 62-65.
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harboring of aliens (8 U.S.C. section 1324) carried with it the mitigating proviso that "employment (including the usual and normal
practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute
harboring." IRCA eliminates this proviso, thus opening a whole new
area of concern and interpretation to employers. 191 The greater potential for criminal liability in the absence of the "Texas proviso",
must be kept in mind, is likely to be the subject of much future
debate and litigation, and certainly must be factored into any warrant/probable cause analysis relating to immigration officers' entry
onto employers' premises.
It should be pointed out here that the new immigration law of
1986 expresses as a "sense of Congress" the:
increase in the border patrol and other inspection and enforcement
activities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and of
other appropriate Federal agencies in order to prevent and deter
the illegal entry of aliens into the United States and the violation
of the terms of their entry. .. ."'
The Immigration Service has in the past placed emphasis upon enforcement.193 However, while increased inspection activity is encouraged-as well as funded under the new Act-Congress has expressed no desire to carve out exceptions to or to reduce
constitutional protections in this area. In fact, it would seem that
now more than ever these protections are acutely needed, as will be
discussed below. Major issues to be addressed under the new Act
are: the authority of INS officers to enter employers' premises now
warrantlessly for any purpose other than to inspect and ensure paper
compliance under the new EVS; in addition, the degree of specificity
required in such warrants must also be considered and re-examined.
V.

ANALYSIS

It seems clear that the introduction of criminal sanctions for
employers should lead the judicial system to require criminal probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search commercial premises in the future. Although such a search might still be conducted
pursuant to a civil administrative mandate, in the case of civil investigation or violations under IRCA, the criminal repercussions to
which the employer is now subject and may be simultaneously or
191. See supra at notes 62-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of "Texas
provisio."
192. IRCA § Ill(a)(1).
193. See Note, supra note 73, at 519.
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subsequently subjected, should elevate the standard of review for
warrants or enforcement of administrative subpoenas to that of criminal probable cause in all cases. 9 A higher degree of probable cause
would more adequately protect the commercial operator's Fourth
Amendment rights, and also presumably further restrict the availability of enforceable warrants, by requiring stricter adherence to
clearer, more rigorous particularity and specificity requirements.
Because of the nature of these criminal sanctions applicable
against employers, it is argued that the same standard of criminal
probable cause would similarly be required for INS officers to search
for illegal aliens in public areas of an employer's premises, as well as
in private areas, regardless of the proximity of the employer's establishment to the border. Moreover, the criminal probable cause standard should also be necessary regardless of the "label" of or type of
the warrant, i.e. inspection or seizure. It would appear that in the
immigration law context, little difference exists between warrants of
inspection or seizure, as inspection that successfully identifies poten95
tially unauthorized workers will in most cases lead to seizure.
Arguably, any entry onto employer premises by INS for any
purpose other than the checking of 1-9 verification forms and employer compliance with recordkeeping requirements should require a
valid warrant based upon satisfaction of a standard of criminalprobable cause. Unless the employer has provided consent,"9 the INS
agents inspecting EVS compliance should not be able to question any
employees on the premises or otherwise search for other evidence
outside of the records they are authorized to inspect. In order to exceed their grant of authority to inspect an employer's paperwork
files, INS agents should be required to obtain a warrant based upon
criminal probable cause for authorization to seek out and question
any employees on the premises, since employers may now be crimi194. It should be remembered that even in the area of inspection and noncompliance
with the new EVS, while penalties are civil for "non-pattern and practice" violations, misstate-

ments on the 1-9 forms carry with them possible risk of criminal perjury, should an intentional
falsehood be detected. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
195. The Justice Department's express policy is that a warrantless arrest is permitted if
the immigration officer believes that the individual is likely to escape before a warrant can be
obtained. See Justice Memorandum, supra note 98 at 16 (citing INA § 287(a)(2),(4), 8
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2),(4) (1970)). An officer finding an alien with an altered resident alien card
can make the arrest without a warrant. Other types of behavior on the part of the alien, such
as attempted flight or nervousness suggesting the search for an opportunity to flee may be used
as a basis to a warrantless arrest. See Justice Memorandum at 16. However a warrantless
arrest is unlawful where the officer has no reason to believe that the individual is likely to
escape. Id. (citing U.S. ex rel. Martinez-Angosto v. Mason, 344 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1965)).
196. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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nally liable for knowing or reckless employment of these individuals.
Criminal probable cause necessarily requires strict scrutiny by the
courts for a warrant or enforcement of an administrative subpoena,
and particularity and specificity with respect to names and facts
should be required.
The issue of employer consent to INS inspection in the context
of legal entry and permissible search and seizure action is also of
heightened concern after IRCA. It is suggested the employers' counsel keep the issue in mind when advising employers whether or not
they should consent. It is certainly clear that employers are under no
obligation to consent to INS employee inspection. If the attorney is
counseling after the employer has already consented, the question of
whether the consent was given voluntarily must be explored. In this
regard, the Mendenhall factors 197 provide some guidance as to indicia of facts that may invalidate the employer's consent. 9 It is here
posited that Mendenhall should be read broadly and that the list of
factors should be expanded on a case by case basis.
Another related question, yet to be answered, is: whether employees may sue their employer for violation of their constitutional
rights where these rights have been infringed as a direct result of the
employer's having consented to INS entry, inspection, and
questioning.
Moreover, it would also appear that the recordkeeping and verification process outlined by Congress provides a satisfactory and arguably exclusive method by which INS officials, including Border
Patrol officers, may now pursue their enforcement activities without
warrant on employer premises. It could be posited that, in setting up
such an integrated, extensive, preemptive system of regulation, Congress has established an exclusive method by which INS officials
should enforce the new laws, with respect to employers and the work
place. In effect, the EVS creates and provides a built-in system of
personnel evidence and documentation that can be used to construct
a proper record for legal affidavits and warrants.' 99 This extensive
regulatory system would not only support the criminal probable
197. See supra notes 107 and 113 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
199. It is here noted then when IRCA was first enacted, some immigration experts questioned the personnel or rigorousness that the INS would dedicate to investigations or verification checks in its enforcement of the employer provisions. See M. Roberts and S. Yale-Loehr,
Employers as Junior Immigration Inspectors: The Impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform
Control Act, 21 INT'L LAW 1013, 1053 (1987) [hereinafter "JuniorImmigration Inspectors']
However the INS has already issued thousands of warning citations and notices of intent to
fine. See Interpreter Releases, Vol. 65, No. 6, February 8, 1988, p. 133.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol5/iss1/1

36

Susman: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"): Impact U

19871

Immigration Reform and Control Act

cause standard and the warrant requirement, but would also seem to
support requiring even stricter scrutiny of the reasons for issuance
and enforcement of a search warrant.
It could be argued that Congress has relegated INS enforcement activities to the terms of the new act: namely, that through the
strict requirements of employer verification and recordkeeping, INS
has a clear, legislatively mandated system of detection. Greater violations should be spotted through enforcement of the EVS, and employers will have the opportunity under this system to adjust their
employment habits and procedures, or else risk mounting civil and
criminal penalties and possibly criminal sanctions for unauthorized
alien employment, "harboring" or pattern and practice violations.
Certainly the above analysis may appear stronger at first blush
as it relates to private areas of employers' premises, but in view of
the severe potential criminal sanctions to which employers may now
be subject under the new laws, a warrant based on the criminal standards of probable cause would also seem necessary, based upon the
same reasoning, for any search, seizure or questioning amounting to
forcible or detentive interrogation on the public areas of employers'
premises as well.
In this regard, the particular location or space of the employer's
premises should not be a major consideration in the Fourth Amendment analysis. But rather, at least a minimal reasonable expectation
of freedom from fear of intrusion by private persons or government
should be uniformly held, regardless of location, in the sense that the
same conduct basically offends in the same way, irrespective of
where it takes place.200 Moreover, this rationale is entirely consistent
with the reasoning and decision in the Barbera"'l case, in which the
Second Circuit required "founded suspicion" that a person is an
alien as a prerequisite to the INS investigator's right to question on
a public bus.a20
The new "harboring statute" presents numerous novel issues
and problems. 0 3 First, the elimination of what had commonly come
to be known as the "Texas proviso" gives rise to the question of what
was the intended and will be the actual impact of this modification.
200.

In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated that, "[i]f in light of our shared sensibilities,

those activities are of a kind in which people should be able to engage without fear of intrusion
by private persons or government officials, we extend the protection of the Fourth Amendment

to the space in question.
201.
202.
203.

...
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 191 (1984).

514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).
See Fragomen, Jr., supra note 73, at 115.
See supra notes 35-53.
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It is here noted that in its least harmful sense, the deletion of the
proviso could be viewed as a symbolic gesture. 04 It would seem inconsistent with the overall scheme and purposes of IRCA to impose
the severe criminal penalties of the new statute for mere employment
alone. This would argue for the requirement of some concept of "employment plus," whether or not based upon the prior law. It is here
suggested that the prior law provides a good model for "employment
plus," 20 5 and that despite the change in language, certain particular,
unusual or extraordinary circumstances, where the employer has specifically facilitated the alien's travel to or maintenance of the alien in
the United States, should be required to be present before these provisions would be triggered.206
Moreover, the state of mind standard has been relaxed, so that
this feature alone will open up wider the potential net of violators to
include not only knowing employers, but also reckless employers. 07
It is also here noted that even a mere pattern and practice of violative employer conduct toward numerous unrelated unauthorized
aliens would not seem likely to trigger the new harboring provisions,
as pattern and practice violations are already provided for elsewhere
in the Act.208
Recklessness in modern statutes is a form of "general intent"
and is based on a degree of conduct in the performance of an act. "A
person is reckless or acts recklessly when such person 'consciously
disregards a substantial and justifiable risk which, by the standards
of a reasonable person, substitute a gross deviation from standard
conduct.' "209 It should be noted that it is the conscious awareness of

the risk which "implies disregard of the rules of diligence and heedlessness of the consequences

. . .

of such a character as to show an

utter disregard of the safety of others under circumstances likely to
cause injury."2 10 In spite of the new relaxed and less than specific
204. See L. Rosenberg, supra note 39 at 144-45 (whether or not intended to be primarily a symbolic gesture, deletion of the proviso leaves the plain statutory language without qual-

ification and subject to judicial interpretation).
205.

Id. at 145, suggesting that the INS could issue an operating instruction restricting

agency enforcement of the harboring subsection to "employment plus" situations.
206.

See, e.g. U.S. v. Mount Fuju Japanese Steak House, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 1194

(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (Employer provided restaurant workers with food, shelter, and other services,
in addition to employment).

207. See supra notes 42-49, 52 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. It should be noted that these provisions also criminalize conduct resulting in pattern or practice violations.
209. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 29, at 271 (citing People v. Ford, 56 Ill. App. 2d 153,
206 N.E.2d 105 (1965) and People v. Baier, 203 N.E.2d 633 (1965)).

210. M.

BAsslouNI,

supra note 29, at 271 (citing People v. Sikes, 328 Ill. 64, 74, 159

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol5/iss1/1

38

Susman: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"): Impact U
19871

Immigration Reform and Control Act

knowledge standard, an employer must, at a minimum, be consciously aware of the risks that he may be in violation of the U.S.

immigration laws before he/she would be deemed to have the minimal reckless mental state.
Despite efforts by the INS to educate business owners, there are
going to be many who possess little information or understanding
about the immigration laws in general, and even less awareness of
specific new provisions.2 ' After all, it seems unlikely that the Act's
intent was to make every employer an expert in the numerous tech-

nicalities of the immigration laws.212 On the other hand, certain basic compliance will no doubt be immediately mandated.213
It is therefore critical that employers learn to and proceed to
comply with the new EVS requirements. Good faith compliance will
at least ensure employers an affirmative defense in prosecution under
the new laws.214 The open problematic question seems to be: to what
in documentaextent will employers be blamed for inconsistencies
215
problems?
compliance
faith
good
tion, and other
N.E.2d 105 (1927)).
211. "Surveys conducted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Dallas Times Herald
and Robert Half International, as well as statistics from the Department of Labor, offer somewhat contradictory evidence as to the percentage of employers who are aware of and complying with their obligations under the new law." Interpreter Releases, Vol. 65, No. 6, February
8, 1988, p. 133. Department of Labor ("DOL") statistics reveal that one-third of all employers
questioned by DOL inspectors were ignorant of the law. Seventy-five percent of attorneys
questioned in the Dallas Times Herald survey. Id. at 134. In general, the new laws apply to
employers of all sizes. See G. Morales & R. Winterscheidt, Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986-An Overview, 3 LAB. LAw 717 (1987) ("This new legislation. . . for the first
time requires all employers to become familiar with the immigration law and policy.")
212. Cf. Junior Immigration Inspectors, supra note 199 at 1013 ("These provisions create major new responsibilities for businesses and in effect deputize them as junior immigration
inspectors.") But see, A Corchado, Border Troubles: New Immigration Law Riles Small Businesses in Places Like El Paso, Wall St. J., May 4, 1988, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter "Border
Trouble"] (". . . employers all over the country. . . are being forced to keep such books and
to become unwilling INS agents.")
213. It is noted that the INS began issuing citations for an employer's first offense of
knowingly hiring an illegal alien on June 1, 1987. On June 1, 1988, fines will replace paper
citations for first offenses. See Interpreter Releases, Vol. 65, No. 6, February 8, 1988, at 133.
214. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
215. Recently, the Wall Street Journal reported the following:
In San Antonio and Austin, Texas, recently, INS agents simultaneously
swooped into six stores of the Taco Cabana restaurant chain for an early morning
raid. They nabbed nearly two dozen workers and searched through the employer's
personnel and payroll records. Along with their warrants, the agents carried an affidavit alleging fraudulent documents were being sold in Mexico specifically to obtain
jobs at Taco Cabana.
Patrick Thomas, the company's lawyer, denies that the chain had anything to
do with such documents. But he concedes, "There is a document problem, a horrendous document problem."
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It would appear, in light of IRCA and case law, that in the
border area, as in non-border areas of the country, INS' authority to
interrogate on private property, including commercial property, can
only be derived from the issuance of a warrant or special circumstances. Further support of this appears in the new laws under
IRCA, as Section 287(d) of the Act is amended to require INS officers and employers to obtain a properly executed warrant in order
to enter onto a farm or other outdoor agricultural operations, for the
purpose of questioning suspected aliens as to their rightful presence
in the U.S.2 16 This section expands the protection of individuals
against unreasonable searches by extending Fourth Amendment protection in the case of immigration searches of farms and open fields.
The section invalidates the application of the Supreme Court decision in Oliver v. United States, 17 which permitted immigration
searches of farms and open fields. Oliver involved a warrantless
search by police officers of private land for evidence of marijuana
propagation. The Court's finding, that an Oliver search is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment cannot now be used in immigration search cases.21 8

It should be noted that private suits alleging trespass against
immigration officers individually have, in the past, not been successTaco Cabana expects to receive a notice of "intent to fine" from the INS. But
back at INS headquarters in Washington, a spokesman won't confirm that.
D. Solis, "Immigration Law Cuts Illegal Border Crossing, But It's No Panacea," Wall St. J.,
Nov. 6, 1987, at 1, col. 1. See Border Trouble, supra note 212, at 12 ("to avoid fines, some
employers . . . quietly condone the use of false documents, which are proliferating due to the
harsh impact the new immigration laws are having on their businesses"). See also, H. Kestin,
Papers Please "Hey No Problem", FORBES, January 25, 1988, at 84. (describes documentvending as a profession in Los Angeles; provides further examples of immigration related documentation fraud)
216. IRCA § 116, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (amending INA § 287). The text of the new law is
as follows:
SECTION 116.
RESTRICTING WARRANTLESS ENTRY IN THE CASE OF OUTDOOR
AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS
Section 287 (8 U.S.C. 1357) is amended by adding at the end of the following new
subsection:
(d)Notwithstanding any other provision of this section other than paragraph (3) of
subsection (a), an officer or employee of the Service may not enter without the consent of the owner (or agent thereto) or a properly executed warrant onto the premises of a farm or other outdoor agricultural operation for the purpose of interrogating a person believed to be an alien as to the person's right to be or to remain in the
United States.
217. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
218. See also Taylor v. Fine, 115 F. Supp. 68, 71 (S.D. Calif. 1953) (amendment also
overrules Taylor principle that open fields are outside of the scope of the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures).
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ful. 219 It can be further observed that so-called "constitutional torts,"
or Bivens 220 actions, have also proven unsuccessful. However, these
private rights of action against INS officers individually should be
kept in mind as potential limitations on their conduct and the exercise of their authority in future enforcement under IRCA. Now that
the proverbial "stakes have been raised," it may be time to reassess
potential remedies in these areas for infringement of Fourth Amendment rights.
Moreover, perhaps it is time to challenge the constitutionality of
INA section 287, authorizing warrantless interrogation and arrest of
suspected aliens. In the past, the tension between INA section 287
and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was more obvious or understandable. 221 Alienage generally carried no implication
of criminal activity.222 In contrast, alienage now clearly carries with
it the onus, the risks and the penalties of criminal activity. No employer or employee should be subjected to warrantless interrogation,
which may itself be or become a seizure.223
In any case, perhaps the new criminalization of alienage also
will impact the results, if not the reasoning, in cases such as INS v.
Delgado.224 While Delgado pre-IRCA precedent would appear to allow "mere questioning" by the INS of anyone as to their immigrasuspicion of alienage, provided the encounter was
tion status without
"voluntary," 225 it would now appear that something more should be
required. Hence a new focus and emphasis upon the "reasonable sus219.

Id. In Taylor, immigration officers approached the plaintiff's ranch in the course of

execution of their enforcement duties, and asked some Mexican laborers working there if they
were legally in the United States, and upon admissions from some Mexicans there, took labor-

ers into custody. The district court in that case stated:
[i]f it were possible to submit officers of the United States Immigration Service to
harassment every time they search for illegal entrants, if they could be subjected to
suits even for nominal damages, the landowners . . . would be erecting barriers
against the United States Government, and, in effect, telling the officers of the Government, 'Do not enter, no matter what federal laws are violated.'

Id.
220. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). The Bivens cause of action is a judicially created implied federal cause of action

for damages against federal officers in their personal capacities for injuries caused by constitutional torts. Bivens was brought directly under the Fourth Amendment; but the term has come

to identify any constitutionally implied cause of action for damages.
221.
222.

See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 73, at 502.

223. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (Fourth Amendment
applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short

of traditional arrest).
224.

466 U.S. 210 (1984).

225. See Note, supra note 73, at 503.
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picion" requirement in such cases as Barbera, setting forth the
"founded suspicion" requirement is certainly in order.
The Supreme Court in Delgado22 suggested the open possibility
that refusal to respond to INS agents' questions may supply the ap-

propriate level of reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage to justify
further detentive questioning. It is suggested that the question of
whether this could have been the law prior to IRCA is now somewhat mooted in view of the severe criminal penalties applicable to
both employers and employees for violations of certain new provisions under IRCA. As a result, it is here asserted that silence on the
part of employer and employee would now certainly seem to be a
legitimate choice consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and based
on, among other rights, the Fifth Amendment protection against
227
self-incrimination.
Under the new laws, it is here suggested that this possibility is
further closed by the possibility that Miranda warnings may now be
required, where an individual is detained or otherwise placed within
INS custody.2 28 First, as for employers, in the face of arrest for alleged criminal violations under IRCA, Miranda warnings would certainly be necessary, consistent with other arrest contexts. As for employees, as it may now be criminal to be an unauthorized worker,
and because of possible uncertainties of whether an individual is, in
fact, an authorized worker or unauthorized alien, it is unclear, but
certainly more impressive than in the past, that Miranda warnings
226. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 210.
227. U.S. CONsT. amend V provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
228. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that before a
person in custody may be subjected to interrogation, he "must be adequately and effectively
apprised of his rights." In particular
he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to
remain silent ...
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court.
. . . (A)n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he
has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
interrogation . ..
(I)t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an
attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
Id. See also W. LAFAVE & G. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, Vol. 1 (1984).
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might be administered at the time of detention or arrest. 22 9
VI.

CONCLUSION

In sum, employers and employees are protected by the Fourth
Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure. Although INS Border Officers have authority to access private lands
within twenty-five miles from the external boundaries of the U.S.,
this authority is limited to the "patrolling of the border to prevent
the illegal entry of aliens." 23 0
Moreover, although INS officers and its Border Patrol have
broad powers to ferret out aliens, a warrant obtained on the basis of
probable cause is necessary to inspect commercial enterprises for
aliens, except where the employer has voluntarily consented. 23

1

To

date, case law regarding the issue of probable cause has indicated
that a flexible "civil" standard has been used in connection with warrants of inspection,2 32 and criminal specificity has been required in
other cases.2 33 However, in light of IRCA, a criminal law standard

of probable cause would appear manifestly appropriate now, in any
case. It is here argued that this standard should hold true for both
public as well as private areas of commercial premises, and should
include all varieties of warrants, regardless of, designation or nomenclature. In this regard, InternationalMolders' was correctly decided
under pre-IRCA law, but should now be read more expansively. The
D.C. Circuit Court's decision in Blackie's, in contrast, no longer provides a proper foundation for analysis after the enactment of IRCA.
The impact of IRCA should toll the death knoll of the "general" or
"open-ended" warrant and should signal the demise of the traditional "area control operations" or "factory sweeps."
In order to minimize exposure to new liabilities under the
IRCA, and to ensure INS adherence to fundamental Fourth Amendment standards, business owners should be counseled to withhold,
229. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Prior to Schneckloth, which
decided that Miranda warnings were not required, it was unclear whether an individual detained on immigration law grounds had to be informed of his/her right to withhold consent to
either a search or a seizure. But see, Mathis v. U.S. 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (where a criminal
prosecution is contemplated the full Miranda warnings must be given before any questioning
may occur once the suspected alien is in custody.).
230. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (1970).
231. Even where the employer has consented, there is still room for argument that the
new criminal liabilities imposed upon unlawful aliens would now require separate valid consent
from each employee as well.
232. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
233. International Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 674 F.
Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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under most circumstances, consent to an INS request to enter the
premises to engage in inspection or search activity (for other than
compliance with the EVS program) or to question their employees. 23 This will require the INS to obtain a valid search warrant in
order to effect entry; and will further require, at a minimum, a
showing of individualized reasonable suspicion that illegal aliens are
on the premises. 3 5 Even where an owner provides consent for INS
entry onto premises (for purposes other than inspection of forms 1-9
under the EVS), perhaps there are greater Mendenhall concerns,
and greater reason to question the voluntariness of an employer's
consent, now that enforcement has been stepped up, and the penalties increased. If the INS is compelled to obtain a search warrant,
the validity of the warrant is then open to challenge in any subsequent litigation.
A pre-IRCA commentator has pointed out the attractiveness of
bringing this issue to the surface, "in light of the unsettled state of
the law. '2 36 Now more than ever under the new rules of IRCA, it is
important that these issues are raised, challenged and clarified, as
IRCA has, at this stage and in the areas of Fourth Amendment safeguards, only muddied already cloudy waters. It is hoped that the
strong provisions of IRCA will help to push these issues to the fore,
and will provide the additional impetus necessary to resolve both old
and new questions.

234. This will have the further effect of curtailing "factory sweeps." See Note, supra
note 73, at 519.
235. Incredibly, ninety percent of all business owners consent to the INS' entry without
requiring the INS to obtain a valid search warrant. Note, supra note 73, at 482, n.71, and 519
(citing International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)).
236. Note, supra note 73, at 520.
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